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tionally, documents the distributional implications of this earnings-related
heterogeneity. We find a strong association between lifetime earnings and
life expectancy at age 65 and show that the longevity gap is increasing across
cohorts. For West German men born 1926-28, the longevity gap between top
and bottom decile amounts to about 4 years (about 30%). This gap increases
to 7 years (almost 50%) for cohorts 1947-49. We extend our analysis to the
household context and show that lifetime earnings are also related to the life
expectancy of the spouse. The heterogeneity in life expectancy has sizable
and relevant distributional consequences for the pension system: when ac-
counting for heterogeneous life expectancy, we find that the German pension
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1. Introduction
Inequality of lifetime earnings, consumption, and wealth has been increasing over time
and between cohorts in most OCED countries, see e.g. Kopczuk et al. (2010), Attanasio
and Pistaferri (2016), or Saez and Zucman (2016). One other important dimension of
inequality which is highly correlated with the economic inequality is the heterogeneity
in life expectancy (Cutler et al. (2006)).
This paper provides novel evidence about the heterogeneity in life expectancy and
how this heterogeneity has evolved between cohorts. Further we analyze the distribu-
tional implications of heterogeneity in life expectancy for the pension system. First,
we document the heterogeneity in life expectancy by lifetime earnings and show how
the earnings-related longevity gap has evolved over 24 cohorts, born 1926 through 1949.
Second, in addition to this direct relation between lifetime earnings and life expectancy
we focus on an important indirect relation: we extend the analysis of life expectancy to
the household context and analyze how the life expectancy of widows depends on their
husband’s lifetime earnings. Further, earnings-related heterogeneity does not only mean
that individuals with higher lifetime earnings enjoy a longer life, it also has consequences
for the inequality of lifetime income through the pension system: individuals with higher
lifetime earnings enjoy a longer life and therefore they receive pensions for a longer pe-
riod. The final section of this paper focuses on this link and quantifies the distributional
implications for the German pension system, which has, in contrast to Social Security,
a strong contributory link.
The first part of the empirical analysis is based on administrative data covering the
universe of German retirees and focuses on West German men. The data includes
information about pension entitlements, which directly depend on lifetime earnings,
year of birth, and date of death. This enables us to estimate age-specific mortality rates
conditional on birth cohort and decile of lifetime earnings. Based on these mortality
rates, we derive cohort- and earnings-specific life expectancies at age 65 and provide
evidence of how earnings-specific life expectancies changed over cohorts. In a similar
manner, we show how the husband’s lifetime earnings relate to the heterogeneity of
widows’ life expectancies and how this heterogeneity differs between cohorts.
In the second part, we focus on the distributional implications of heterogeneous life
expectancy for the pension system. We link the estimated mortality rates to adminis-
trative biography data for cohorts 1935-1949. We then calculate cohort-specific distri-
butions of individual pension wealth and of internal rate of returns (IRR). To quantify
the distributional implications, we compare distributions of pension wealth and IRR
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with heterogeneous mortality rates to distributions for which we impose homogeneous
mortality rates. Finally, we extend the analysis to the household context and account
for survivor benefits for spouses and, using additional assumptions, we provide evidence
on how mortality prior to age 65 may affect the distributional implications.
We find a strong association between lifetime earnings and life expectancy at age 65
and show that the longevity gap is increasing across cohorts. For West German men
born 1926-28, the difference in life expectancy at age 65 between top and bottom decile
amounts to about 4 years or close to 30%. For this group, the gap increases to about
7 years (almost 50%) for cohorts 1947-49. Further, we show that the increase in the
longevity gap is driven by a larger increase in life expectancies in the upper deciles. For
individuals in the bottom decile, life expectancy hardly changed over time. The analysis
on the household level documents important indirect effects which reinforce the role of
lifetime earnings for life expectancy. We show that life expectancy of widows is increasing
with the lifetime earnings of the partner. For widows married to men born in 1926-28
we find a longevity gap between top and bottom quintile of male lifetime earnings of
about 2.5 (more than 10%) year which increases to 4 years for widows married to men
boron in 1947-49 (about 20%).
The earnings-related heterogeneity in life expectancy has sizable and relevant distri-
butional consequences for the pension system. We find that the German pension system
is progressive when we impose homogeneous life expectancy within a cohort. However,
when accounting for heterogeneous life expectancy, the distributional implications turn
around: we show that the IRR of pension contributions increase in lifetime earnings,
making the pension system regressive. Further, we document – consistently with the
increasing longevity gap – an increase of the regressive structure across cohorts.
Our study is related to the literature that focuses on heterogeneity in life expectancy
and related distributional implications. Prior studies document heterogeneity in life ex-
pectancy and an increasing longevity gap by earnings over cohorts or time using survey
data, such as the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), administrative social security
records, or tax records; see e.g. Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), Waldron (2007) and
Chetty et al. (2016). von Gaudecker and Scholz (2007) and Kiebele et al. (2013) focus
on Germany. Based on administrative pension data they show that longevity is strongly
associated with lifetime earnings and socio-economic status and they provide evidence
for an increasing longevity gap for individuals with low and high socio-economic status
between two time periods, 1995-1996 and 2007-2008. In our analysis we extend this
literature; we study the inequality of life expectancy not only on the individual level but
we provide as well evidence about the indirect effect in the household context. More-
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over, we provide novel evidence for Germany as we document the changes in longevity
differences by decile of lifetime earnings over a long time period, namely for cohorts 1926
- 1949.
In addition, our study contributes to the literature on the distributional implica-
tions of heterogeneous life expectancy for transfer programs and the pension system,
e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier (2001), Coronado and Glass (2002), Liebman (2002), and
more recently, Auerbach et al. (2017) for simulation studies for the US, or Breyer and
Hupfeld (2009) for Germany.1 Further, several studies theoretically analyze the optimal
design of the pension system when life expectancy is heterogeneous (for an overview see
Pestieau and Ponthiere (2016)) or use structural models to quantify the distributional
and welfare implications of pension reforms, e.g. Fehr et al. (2013), Bagchi (2016), and
Sanchez-Romero and Fu¨rnkranz-Prskawetz (2017). For example Sanchez-Romero and
Fu¨rnkranz-Prskawetz (2017) develop an overlapping generations model with heteroge-
neous life expectancy, calibrated to the US economy. They confirm the findings of the
simulation studies for the US: because of the earnings-related longevity gap Social Secu-
rity does not redistribute from high skilled individuals to low skilled individuals despite
its progressive design. Our analysis differs from the studies for the US in two important
dimensions. First, we focus on the distributional implications for the German pension
system which has a strong contributory link. Second, instead of using a simulation
model to project the implications of hypothetical pension reforms, we use high quality
administrative data to document the distributional implications of the cohort-specific
pension system in combination with the evolution of cohort-specific heterogeneity in life
expectancy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on the institutional
background and describes the data. In the third part we provide descriptive evidence on
mortality rates and discusses the empirical model and the estimation results of cohort-
specific heterogeneity in life expectancies and their evolution for men and their surviving
spouses. In Section 4, we link these findings to the pension system and analyze their
distributional implications. Section 5 concludes.
1Breyer and Hupfeld (2009) estimate the relationship between annual earnings and life expectancy of
German retirees and derive a hypothetical pension system that guarantees distributive neutrality.
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2. Institutional background and data
2.1. Institutional background
The German statutory pension system is designed as a defined benefit, pay-as-you-go
system. Most employees are mandatorily insured2 and contribute a percentage of their
yearly gross earnings. For their contributions, individuals acquire pension entitlements
in form of earnings points. The number of points are based on the ratio of the individual
wage to the average wage. An individual earns exactly one point (per year) if their
yearly wage corresponds to the average yearly wage, and more (less) points if their wage
exceeds (is below) the average wage. There is a cap for pension contributions, which
corresponds to about two times the average wage, implying that individuals can only
earn up to two earnings points per year.3 Employees accumulate earnings points over
their full working life. At retirement, the total sum of points is multiplied with the
pension value to determine the monthly gross pension.4
In contrast to Social Security in the US, the German pension system has a strong
contributory link: annual pensions are in principle proportional to contributions during
the working life. However, the pension system includes early retirement schemes that
have progressive distributional implications. In particular, for the cohorts considered,
the pension system offers pathways to early retirement before the normal retirement
age of 65 to disabled or unemployed individuals and to those with a long working ca-
reer.5 Individuals can also claim an invalidity pension before being eligible for an old-age
pension. Starting with individuals born after 1937, the specific design for the different
pathways changed as pension reforms introduced deductions for early retirement. These
deductions amount to 3.6% per year of early retirement.6 Still, early retirement re-
mains financially attractive because the actuarial adjustments are too small to be “fair”
(Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998).
2Some specific occupations are exempted as they have their own pension funds, e.g. lawyers and
physicians.
3The social security threshold in West Germany in 2017 was EURO 76,200 per year, corresponding to
a maximum of 2.05 earnings points.
4This value is adjusted every calendar year and was EURO 30.99 in 2017.
5For women there exists an additional early retirement scheme.
6The deductions are gradually introduced and fully apply for cohorts born after 1945. Since the
pathways differ in normal and early retirement age, maximal deductions vary between 7.2% and
18%. For a detailed description of the rules and descriptive evidence about the pension contributions
and pension entitlements of early retirees, see Lu¨then (2016).
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2.2. Pension data
For individuals covered by the pension system, the pension insurance collects the infor-
mation necessary to calculate all potential pensions at any point in time; in particular
the data includes information about entitlements, contributions, date of death and de-
mographic variables like gender or cohort. The data is stored in thematic datasets of
which we use two for our analysis. Our study focuses on West German men and their
widows.7
In the first part of the analysis, to estimate heterogeneous mortality, we employ the
SK90, which covers the universe of all pensioners.8 This data is available for calendar
years 1992-2015 and contains information about individual pension entitlements, pen-
sion level, survivor pensions, and time of death.9 We focus on life expectancy at age
65 when all individuals are retired. This avoids selection problems through varying re-
tirement ages in the different pathways, e.g. early retirement of disabled individuals.
We concentrate on cohorts 1926-1949, as they can be observed at age 65 and at later
ages.10 More specifically, we observe individuals born in 1926 between ages 65 and 88. In
contrast, individuals born in 1949 can only be observed at age 65. For the estimation of
age-specific mortality rates, we also include individuals from earlier cohorts 1905-1925.
While we do not study life expectancies for these cohorts, we exploit the information for
the identification of age profiles of mortality rates at higher ages. In total, we use infor-
mation on 63 million surviving and 3.4 million decedent men. Table A.1 in Appendix I
displays the numbers by cohort.
For institutional reasons, the data does not allow to analyze the relationship between
women’s lifetime earnings and their life expectancies.11 Instead we us the information
about female mortality rates to explore a potentially important indirect relation between
life time income and life expectancy: we analyze the link between widows’ life expectancy
7We exclude East Germans as the information on employment biographies of the cohorts considered
here cannot be directly linked to their lifetime earnings; a large fraction of this information is related
to the earnings history and the pension system of the GDR.
8The SK90 can be accessed via controlled remote computing only. There is no publicly available
description. However, there is a similar publicly available 1% sample, the SUFDemografie, which can
be obtained from the Research Data Center of the German Pension Insurance.
9More specifically, we observe if an individual pension was discontinued during the 12 months preceding
the reporting date (November 30th). For an old-age pension, the only reason for a discontinuation
is the death of the respective individual.
10Since these cohorts are retired at age 65 at the latest, age 65 is the earliest possible age to observe an
entire distribution of pension entitlements.
11Until 1967, it was legally allowed for women to leave the pension system at the time of their marriage
and gain the monetary value of their collected pension entitlements. Until 1995, however, these women
could reenter the pension system through retroactive payments, which were financially attractive. In
the SK90 data we cannot observe if a woman returned to the pension system or not.
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and their husbands’ lifetime earnings. For this analysis, we employ the information
on survivor pensions for widows in the data. We use information about 27.5 million
survivors and 2 million decedents (see Table A.2 in Appendix I). Again, also for widows,
earlier cohorts born before 1926 serve to identify the age-profile of mortality.
The second part of the analysis focuses on the distributional effects of heterogeneous
life expectancy on the pension system. For the calculation of pension benefits, we need
exact information about the individual employment and contribution histories which
is not available in the data that covers the universe of the pensioners. Therefore, we
use the Versicherungskontenstichprobe (VSKT),12 which is a random sub-sample of all
individuals covered by the pension insurance. The VSKT includes complete monthly
employment biographies from ages 14 to 67 for cohorts 1935 through 1985. We concen-
trate on individuals born between 1935 and 1949.13 This leaves us with 14,335 West
German men (see table A.3 in Appendix I for the number of observations by decile and
cohort group).
German pension data cover about 80% of West German men (Bo¨nke et al., 2015). The
data does not cover periods of civil service or self-employment. This implies that self-
employed individuals or civil servants are included with only a fraction of their employ-
ment biography and low amounts of pension entitlements. Therefore, the composition
of individuals at the lower end of the entitlement distribution is very heterogeneous: On
the one hand, it includes long-term unemployed with very low lifetime earnings and, on
the other, self-employed and civil servants with potentially high lifetime earnings. Thus,
a clear interpretation of mortality rates for those with low entitlements is not possible
(see Table A.4 in Appendix I for a depiction of the average time spent in different labor
market states by lifetime earnings decile). We follow previous studies, e.g. Kiebele et al.
(2013) and von Gaudecker and Scholz (2007), and restrict the sample. In our analysis,
we focus on individuals with at least 30 accumulated earnings points. This corresponds
to about 75% of all pensioners.14
12This data is called FDZ-RVVSKT2002, 2004-15 Bo¨nke and is accessible through controlled remote
computing only. A 25% subsample is available as scientific use file.
13We exclude those with special pension arrangements, especially miners. Miners’ pension contributions
include certain special arrangements like expanded healthcare. Thus, miners’ contributions are not
directly comparable to the contributions of regular retirees. Still, our results are robust to an inclusion
of miners.
14Mortality results are robust when changing the threshold to 25 earnings points. Further, we also show
estimated life expectancies that are based on the unrestricted sample in Appendix VI.
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2.3. Lifetime earnings
As discussed in e.g. Auerbach et al. (2017), it is important to use a long term measure
of earnings, such as lifetime earnings, to understand the link between earnings and life
expectancy: the variation in short run measures, such as annual earnings, might be
partly driven by transitory earnings shocks or short term health shocks. As mentioned
above the social security data includes information about the the earnings of the full
working life, this allows us to construct individual lifetime earnings for our analysis.
In the data annual information about earnings is right-censored at the contribution
ceiling. Bo¨nke et al. (2015) show that this concerns about 7% of all earnings of West
German employees per year. At the same time, they provide evidence that earnings
ranks and levels are highly persistent over time. This implies that lifetime earnings esti-
mations based on pension data are censored as well; however, the censoring is limited to
individuals at the top of the earnings distribution. In the following analysis, we consider
deciles of lifetime earnings, thus we use ranks instead of levels of lifetime earnings. In
this way, our estimates are not affected by the censoring. Figure A.1 in Appendix I
provides the decile cut-off values at age 65 by cohort. The cut-off values are expressed in
earnings points and applied to all later ages after age 65. This avoids selection problems
caused by differential mortality.
3. Heterogeneity in life expectancies across cohorts
This section analyzes the heterogeneity in life expectancy across cohorts. First, we
present descriptive evidence about the heterogeneity of age-specific mortality risks. Then
we derive a model to estimate individual life life expectancy at age 65 and show how this
differs between cohorts and earnings deciles. Finally, we look at the household context
and analyze how the life expectancy of widows varies across cohorts and spousal lifetime
earnings.
3.1. Descriptive Evidence
Figure 1 presents observed age-specific survival rates after age 65 a) by lifetime earnings
decile and b) by birth cohort. We depict the corresponding mortality rates for cohorts
1926-1949 in Figure A.2 in Appendix I. Due to our sample structure, mortality and
survival rates at higher ages are only observed for older cohorts. Panel (a) supports the
well known finding of a positive link between level of lifetime earnings and age-specific
survival probabilities, see e.g Cutler et al. (2006). In particular, the data show that sur-
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Source: SK90, waves 1992-2015, own calculations. Notes: The survival rates are com-
puted using the observed mortality rates for cohorts 1926-1949 (as depicted in Figure
A.2 in Appendix I). Panel (a): survival rates at age 65 by decile of lifetime earnings.
Panel (b): survival rates at age 65 by birth cohort group.
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vival probabilities are highest for individuals in the top decile and decline monotonically
across deciles. At age 70, survival probabilities for the top decile are above 90% and
roughly 10 percentage points higher than for the lowest decile. This gap increases to
about 20 percentage points at age 80 and later. Panel (b) displays age-specific survival
rates after age 65 by cohort. In line with e.g. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002), we find a
distinct increase in age-specific survival rates for younger cohorts. For instance, cohorts
1926-28 have a survival probability of about 70% at age 75, which increases to about
80% for cohorts 1941-43.
3.2. Model for life expectancy
Since we do not observe mortality rates over the entire relevant age range, we estimate
conditional age-specific mortality rates by earnings decile between ages 65 to 99. This
allows us to derive cohort and earnings-specific life expectancies. We employ a logistic
regression to estimate the probability of death within the next 12 months conditional
on age. The age effects are heterogeneous and may vary by earnings decile. Further, we
account for cohort-specific fixed effects, fixed effects of earnings deciles and interactions
of cohort and earnings fixed effects. The log-odds have the following form:
log
Pr(deathitcd|survival until age t)








p + µd + ηc + νcd
where individual i is in lifetime earnings decile d of cohort group c and of age t. Co-
horts are grouped into fifteen 3-year birth cohort groups. Deciles are cohort-specific and
computed at age 65.15 We allow for a flexible specification of age effects (4th order poly-
nomial), which is strongly supported by the comparison to a model with non-parametric
age effects (see Figure A.6 in Appendix VI). The estimation includes cohorts born 1905
through 1949. Since we cannot observe lifetime earnings at age 65 for individuals born
before 1926, we refrain from deriving differential mortality rates for cohorts 1905-1925.
As mentioned above, we use information on these individuals to guarantee empirical sup-
port for the relationship between age and mortality at high ages.16 Further, the earnings
fixed effects vary by cohort and age. For the identification of earnings-specific age effects
15See Figure A.1 in Appendix I for details. Cut-off points are fixed within cohort-groups and are not
age-specific. Otherwise, differential mortality causes a selection problem because the cut-off points
and, thus, the composition of individuals in the different deciles would change with age.
16For cohorts 1905-1925, we use cut-off values from cohorts 1926-28 as a proxy. Since earnings points
are a relative measure and depend on the average wage in the respective year, the variation in cut-off
values over cohorts is small.
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we assume that age effects on log-odds of mortality have the same functional relation-
ship across cohorts. Observed patterns of mortality rates support this assumption: As
shown in Figure A.3 in Appendix I, the relationship between age and mortality follows
a similar pattern across cohort groups. Figure A.3 also demonstrates the importance
of heterogeneous age effects by decile. We find that differences in log-odds of mortality
decrease with age. In more detail, individuals with high mortality risks seem to die more
often at younger ages in lower deciles; this leads to a decrease in the heterogeneity of
mortality risks across deciles at higher ages.17
Tables A.5, A.6, and A.7 in Appendix II present our parameter estimates. Due to
the large number of interaction terms, specific parameters are difficult to interpret. For
a clear presentation we use the parameter estimates to predict conditional age-specific
mortality rates and calculate the corresponding life expectancies at age 65 for all cohort
groups and earnings deciles.
3.3. Results for men
Figure 2 shows the heterogeneity in life expectancy at age 65 by earnings decile for
men born between 1926 and 1949. The figure documents two key findings: First, life
expectancy at age 65 strongly varies between earnings deciles and, second, the longevity
gap by earnings increases across cohorts.
For cohorts 1926-28, life expectancy at age 65 amounts to about 18 years at the
top decile and 14 years at the bottom decile. Hence, we find a longevity gap between
the lifetime rich and the lifetime poor of roughly 4 years or in relative terms of nearly
30%. This longevity gap increases over cohorts: 5 years for cohorts 1932-34, 6 years for
cohorts 1938-40, and, finally, 7 years for cohorts 1947-49 which is equivalent of a relative
difference of almost 50%.18 Larger increases in life expectancies in the upper deciles drive
this growth. For the cohorts considered, upper deciles experience an increase of about 4
years in life expectancy at age 65, whereas lower deciles gain only about 1 year. Both life
expectancy and longevity gap increase monotonically with earnings decile. Although,
quantitatively, the picture is quite different for cohorts 1947-49 than for cohorts 1926-28,
the ordering remains and becomes even more pronounced.
17Neglecting heterogeneous age effects leads to an overestimation of the longevity gap for younger cohorts
as they are only observed at younger ages.
18Changes in the heterogeneity of life expectancy can be due to both changes in the lifetime earnings
distribution and changes in the effects of earnings inequality. Furthermore, Currie and Schwandt
(2016) show that cohort-specific changes in life expectancy at age 65 can be affected by composition
effects (e.g. changes in infant mortality).
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Source: SK90, waves 1992-2015, own calculations. Notes: Life expectancy in years after
age 65. Predictions are based on estimated model parameters. Grey areas indicate
95% confidence bands estimated with the Delta method. The calculation assumes that
individuals die with probability 1 at age 100.
3.4. Results for surviving spouses
So far the literature has only concentrated on the relationship between earnings inequal-
ity and individual life expectancy, however implications for the household context are
also important. This is particularly true for female spouses, who, for the cohorts con-
sidered, often have lower lifetime earnings and pension entitlements than their husbands
and rely on their husband’s entitlements. Upon becoming widowed, they receive survivor
pensions, which depend on earnings history and pension entitlements of the deceased
spouse.
To study the relation between individual earnings and the life expectancy of widows as
well as its evolution across cohorts, we modify the afore mentioned framework. Instead
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of male’s mortality, we model the widow’s mortality conditional on the deceased male’s
birth cohort, his lifetime earnings, and a flexible function of his age. Due to the smaller
sample size - in particular for younger ages - we pool two of the cohort groups and
consider quintiles instead of deciles of earnings.19
We estimate the widows’ mortality rates for deceased males’ hypothetical ages up to
109 (instead of 99).20 Hence, we account for a longer period of potential survival when
computing widows’ life expectancies. This is necessary for an accurate prediction of the
widows’ remaining life expectancy conditional on the husband’s death at age 65 because
women have a higher life expectancy and the surviving widows are on average 3 years
younger than their deceased husbands. Since the average age difference between the
spouses is very similar across earnings quintiles and cohorts, the widows are on average
about 62 years in all considered groups.
Figure 3 presents the results of remaining life expectancy of widows of a spouse that
passed away at age 65.21 Overall, our results provide a clear picture: not only the
individual life expectancy is related to lifetime earnings but also the life expectancy of
the spouse. West German women with a partner in the top earnings quintile have a
significantly higher life expectancy than women with a partner in the bottom quintile.
Further, the difference in life expectancy is increasing across cohorts - the longevity gap
between the top and the bottom quintile is about 2.5 years (more than 10%) for cohorts
1926-1931 and increases to 4 years (about 20%) for cohorts 1944-1949. Thus, the results
on the household level reinforce the previous findings about the link between lifetime
earnings and individual life expectancy and the increasing longevity gap.
4. The distributional implication of the longevity gap for the
pension system
In the following, we concentrate on the distributional consequences of the documented
heterogeneity and the increasing longevity gap for the pension system. Heterogeneity
in life expectancy can offset progressive effects or can lead to regressive effects in a
19Widow i’s mortality risk is modeled as log
Pr(deathitcq|survival until age t)





p + µq + ηc + νcq, where q is the quintile of the deceased husband’s lifetime earnings,
c his birth cohort group, and age t the age that the deceased husband would have reached at the
respective reporting date. As widows only enter the sample after the spouse’s death, we do not use
quintile cut-offs from survivor pensions. This would cause a selection problem at age 65 as women
from bottom quintiles would appear disproportionally. Instead, we use our cut-offs for men at age
65 to define the quintiles.
20In order to cover the longer age range, we consider birth cohorts from 1890 (instead of 1905) to 1949.
21Parameter estimates of the modified model for widows can be received from the authors upon request.
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      26-31 32-37 38-43 44-49     
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Source: SK90, waves 1992-2015, own calculations. Notes: Life expectancy of widows in
years, conditional on her husband’s death at age 65. Predictions are based on estimated
model parameters. Grey areas indicate 95% confidence bands estimated with the Delta
method. The calculation assumes that widows die with probability 1 at the age when
the spouse would have turned 110.
proportional pension system. A proportional pension system is ex ante distributionally
neutral if all individuals have the same life expectancy and enter retirement at the same
age. However, if ex ante life expectancy differs systematically between groups, e.g. if
life expectancy is positively correlated with lifetime earnings, high earners receive their
pensions for a longer duration and, thus, their pension wealth is relatively higher.
To isolate the distributional implications of heterogeneous life expectancy for the pen-
sion system, we compare the distributions of pension wealth and internal rates of return
(IRR) in two different scenarios. In the first scenario, we use the estimated heterogeneous
mortality rates and in the second scenario we impose homogeneous mortality rates de-
fined as cohort-specific averages. Pension wealth is calculated as 2015 real present value
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of expected pensions at age 65.22 Pension wealth comparisons allow us to look at gains
and losses of total pension benefits related to heterogeneous life expectancy across the
distribution. To understand the link between pension contributions and benefits, we
analyze the distribution of IRR, which is a measure of the pension system’s rentability.
The IRR treats individual pension contributions as a financial investment: The IRR is
the average individual interest rate that needs to be paid on pension contributions to
yield the expected stream of pensions. The cohort-specific distribution of IRR provides
direct information about the distributional effects of the pension system: higher (lower)
IIR in the upper deciles directly suggest a regressive (progressive) distributional effect of
the pension system (see e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier (2001)).23 Appendix III provides
details about the calculation of both pension wealth and IRR.
4.1. Inequality of Pension Wealth
Panel (a) of Figure Appendix III displays the distribution of pension wealth calculated
with heterogeneous life expectancy by decile for five different cohort groups. By defi-
nition, pension wealth increases by decile as the lifetime rich have made more pension
contributions. However, consistent with an increasing longevity gap, the pension wealth
distribution changes across cohorts. While for cohorts 1935-37, the difference in pension
wealth between top and bottom decile amounts to about 320,000 Euro, this difference
increases to about 440,000 Euro for cohorts 1947-49.
In Panel (b) of Figure Appendix III we show the difference in pension wealth between
the different scenarios with heterogeneous and homogeneous mortality rates. We find
that pension wealth is indeed higher for deciles above the median under the assumption
of heterogeneous mortality, whereas deciles below the median experience a decline. These
distributional implications become more pronounced across cohorts. While the top decile
of cohorts 1935-37 gains about 80,000 Euro when accounting for heterogeneous mortality,
the lowest deciles lose about 30,000 Euro. For cohorts 1947-49, the gain increases to more
than 110,000 Euro for the top decile and the loss to nearly 50,000 Euro for the bottom
deciles.
Finally, cohort-specific Gini coefficients of pension wealth (Table 1) confirm these
findings. When allowing for heterogeneous mortality, the Gini increases from 0.162 to
0.195 across cohorts; under the assumption of homogeneous mortality both level and
22Since we assume that all individuals live until age 65, pensions prior to age 65 are not adjusted with
mortality rates.
23Such an approach might raise concerns about minimum pensions where small contributions lead to
an extremely high return. Due to our sample selection, this does not constitute a problem. All
individuals receive a pension above the minimum pension level.
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Source: FDZ-RVVSKT2002, 2004-15 Bo¨nke, own calculations.Notes: Pension wealth at
age 65 in real 2015 values by decile and cohort group. 95% confidence bands account
for sample variation. Panel (a): levels of pension wealth with heterogeneous mortality.
Panel (b): difference between pension wealth with and without differential mortality.
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Table 1: Ginis of pension wealth at age 65: heterogeneous and homogeneous mortality
Cohort 35-37 38-40 41-43 44-46 47-49
Heterogeneous mortality 0.162 0.166 0.180 0.189 0.195
Homogeneous mortality 0.117 0.116 0.122 0.127 0.133
Difference 0.045 0.05 0.058 0.062 0.062
Notes: Ginis of pension wealth in 2015 real values by cohort
group.
increase of the Gini are lower: from 0.117 to 0.133. Hence, the difference between the
Gini coefficients in the two scenarios increases from 0.45 to 0.62 between cohorts 1935-37
and 1947-49.
4.2. Internal rate of return
In Figure 5, we turn to the IRR and provide direct information about the distributional
effects for the pension system. Panel (a) presents the IRR under the assumption of
homogeneous mortality and Panel (b) under the assumption of heterogeneous mortality.
Figure 6 displays the difference between the two scenarios.
When imposing homogeneous mortality, we find the expected progressive pattern of
the IRR. This pattern is related to early retirement schemes and disability arrangements
in the German pension system, which favor the lifetime poor, see Section 2. For example,
for cohorts 1935-37 we find an IRR of 1.7% in the lowest and of about 1% in the
highest decile.24 When comparing the distributions of the IRR across cohorts, two
findings emerge. First, the overall level of IRR decreases across cohorts, which describes
the declining rentability of the pension system. Second, although the IRR distribution
changes across cohorts, the relative distance between upper and lower deciles remains
fairly similar.
The distributional implications for the pension system completely reverse when we
account for heterogeneous life expectancy by lifetime earnings. Panel (b) of Figure 5
shows the distribution of IRR with heterogeneous mortality rates: IRR increases with
lifetime earnings, implying a regressive pension system. This holds across all cohorts,
although the structure of the IRR differs. For the cohorts 1935-37, we find a u-shaped
24Our estimates of the IRR are slightly lower than in Lu¨then (2016), since we exclude individuals with
very short employment biographies and long pension benefit periods. Other studies (e.g. Schro¨der
(2011)) as well as official statements from the pension insurance report nominal IRR between 2%
and 3%. Given an average inflation rate of about 2.4% since 1950, these estimates are in line with
our results.
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Source: FDZ-RVVSKT2002, 2004-15 Bo¨nke, own calculations.Notes: Internal rates of
return by cohort group and decile based on 2015 real values. 95% confidence bands
account for sample variation. Panel (a): homogeneous mortality rates. Panel (b): het-
erogeneous mortality rates.
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pattern. This is consistent with the results in Panel (a), showing a particular high
IRR for the bottom decile. The finding is related to generous early retirement schemes,
especially for disabled persons. Still, for cohorts 1935-37, the IRR at the bottom (1.2%)
is significantly lower than at the top (1.5%). For younger cohorts, the results are even
stronger. Here we find an increasing pattern of the IRR. For instance, cohorts 1947-1949
reveal an IRR of 1.16% at the top, which is about three times the IRR at the bottom
(0.38%).
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Source: FDZ-RVVSKT2002, 2004-15 Bo¨nke, own calculations. Notes: Difference be-
tween internal rates of return under the assumption of heterogeneous and homogeneous
mortality by cohort group and decile based on 2015 real values. 95% confidence bands
account for sample variation.
The differences in the distributions of the IRR between the scenarios with and without
heterogeneous mortality (Figure 6) isolate the distributional effects of earnings related
differences in life expectancy. For deciles below the median, we find that the IRR is sig-
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nificantly lower under the assumption of heterogeneous mortality; in contrast, for deciles
above the median, the IRR increase. The differences are sizable: for cohorts 1935-37 the
IRR are by 0.5 percentage points lower at the bottom and about 0.5 percentage points
higher at the top. In relative terms, both effects correspond to an about 30% change of
the IRR. In line with the increasing longevity gap, the differential effect increases across
cohorts.
Our findings are consistent with the mentioned results for US Social Security, which
suggest that heterogeneity in life expectancy reduces the progressivity of the system.
The distributional implications for the German pension system are even stronger: the
regressive effects of earnings-related life expectancy outweigh the progressive effects of
early retirement and disability arrangements. Therefore the pension system is clearly
regressive. Moreover, our results show important changes between cohorts. In addition
to the overall decline in the system’s rentability for younger cohorts, the increasing
longevity gap increases the system’s regressivity.
The final sections provide evidence that our results are robust to two important ex-
tensions. First, we show that the regressive effects of the pension system persist when
accounting for survivor pensions in addition to individual pensions. Second, we use ex-
ternal data to approximate mortality rates before age 65, which allows us to look at the
distributional effects of heterogeneity in mortality rates over a longer age range.
4.3. Extension 1: Survivor pensions as additional benefits
Heterogeneous life expectancy not only matters with respect to own pensions, but also
affects the distributional implications of survivor pensions. We can use the estimated
heterogeneity in the mortality of widows, in order to explicitly account for differences
in the expected duration of benefit recipience. Over the considered period, German
pension insurance spends about 20% of its retirement expenses on widow(er) pensions
(Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2015)). Widow(er) pensions are also proportional to
individual contributions and support the spouse’s living standard in case of low own
old-age income. Therefore, these pensions can be regarded as additional returns to
pension contributions.
Widow(er) pensions may have distributional effects for three reasons. First, in case
of an early death, survivors potentially benefit from survivor pensions for a longer time
because the survivor starts receiving the pension at a younger age. This could counteract
the regressive effects of heterogeneous mortality rates. Second, as documented above,
spouses of high earners have a higher life expectancy (Figure 3). Hence, survivor pensions
could further enhance the regressive influence of heterogeneous mortality on the pension
20
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Source: FDZ-RVVSKT2002, 2004-15 Bo¨nke, own calculations. Notes: Pension wealth
and IRR by cohort group and decile based on 2015 real values. Dark grey areas indicate
the additional pension wealth or internal rate of return when accounting for survivor
benefits in addition to individual benefits (light grey). 95% confidence bands account
for sample variation.
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system. Third, the share of surviving spouses may differ by lifetime earnings and e.g. a
regressive effect could emerge if the lifetime poor are less likely be married and, thus, to
leave a surviving spouse at a given age of death. To incorporate widow pensions in our
estimation, we need to combine the probability of receiving a survivor benefit with the
pension level. Both are obtained from SK90 data (see Appendix IV for details).
Figure 7 shows the distributional effects of the pension system when we consider
survivor pensions (dark grey) in addition to own entitlements (light grey). Panel (a)
presents the distribution of accumulated pension wealth; Panel (b) displays the resulting
IRR. We find that survivor pensions increase pension wealth for all deciles, and while the
upper deciles gain more in absolute terms, lower deciles benefit over-proportionally. This
is reflected by the larger increases of the IRR both in relative and absolute terms. For
example, for cohorts 1947-49 the IRR increases from 0.38% to 0.73% at the bottom and
from 1.16%to 1.4% at the top. Hence, the distributional effect of the earlier death of low
earners dominates the regressive effects of longer living widows and higher marriage rates
of high earners. However, distributional effects of the pension system remain regressive
- in particular over the largest part of the distribution IRR are increasing with lifetime
earnings.
4.4. Extension 2: Differential mortality before age 65
Empirical evidence shows that heterogeneous mortality by education, earnings, and
wealth exists before age 65, see e.g. Cutler et al. (2006). This might also have dis-
tributional implications for the pension system. In particular, if individuals die before
entering retirement, they do not receive pensions, despite their contributions made to
the pension insurance.25 This implies that the regressive effects of the pension system
might be stronger than previously documented. Since the data does not allow to esti-
mate cohort-specific mortality rates by lifetime earnings before age 65, we approximate
the mortality rates by combining age- and cohort-specific mortality rates provided by
the German Federal Statistical Office26 and our estimated heterogeneous mortality rates
at age 65.
In more detail, we assign our estimated heterogeneity at age 65 to all ages from 14
to 64 and rescale the rates to match the average age- and cohort-specific rates provided
by Federal Statistical Office27. This approximation rests on the assumption that age-
25Of course, they can still leave survivor pensions.
26Available online at https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/Bevoel-
kerungsbewegung/Kohortensterbetafeln.html (accessed on February 1, 2017). The rates are com-
puted based on German register data.
27We do not consider mortality rates before age 14. Before age 14, individuals do not contribute to the
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Source: FDZ-RVVSKT2002, 2004-15 Bo¨nke, own calculations. Notes: Pension wealth
and IRR by cohort group and decile based on 2015 real values. Dark grey areas indicate
the pension wealth or internal rate of return when accounting for mortality before age
65 in contrast to benefits conditional on reaching age 65 (light grey). 95% confidence
bands account for sample variation.
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specific heterogeneity is constant in relative terms before age 65. Thus, we do not capture
potential changes in the distribution of age-specific mortality rates between cohorts, as
discussed in Currie and Schwandt (2016). As documented in Figure A.3 in Appendix I,
heterogeneity in mortality risks across deciles of lifetime earnings declines in age. If this
relationship between age and mortality differences also holds before age 65, this would
suggest even larger heterogeneity before age 65. Therefore, our assumption of constant
differences in mortality rates is rather conservative and in this sense our results could
be interpreted as lower bound effects.
Figure A.5 in Appendix V displays predicted mortality and survival rates until age
65 by deciles of lifetime earnings, where the survival rates are conditional on reaching
age 14. The deciles refer to the lifetime earnings that the individuals would achieve
if reaching age 65. For cohorts 1947-49, the survival difference at age 65 between top
and bottom decile amounts to 14.4 percentage points (75.8% versus 90.2%). For cohorts
1935-37, this difference is 17.5 percentage points. The larger difference for older cohorts
follows from their higher level of average mortality before age 65. Further, our results
suggest low effects of heterogeneous mortality before age 40 and increasing effects toward
age 65.
Figure 8 compares the distribution of pension wealth and IRR with heterogeneous
mortality rates before age 65 (dark grey) to our main results (light grey), see as well
Figures Appendix III and 5. As expected, the regressive effects of the pension system
are even stronger with heterogeneous mortality before age 65. The results show lower
pension wealth for all deciles. In relative terms the effects are strongest for the lower
deciles (Panel a). This explains why IRR for individuals in the lowest deciles are reduced
over-proportionally (Panel b). For individuals in later cohorts IRR become even negative.
This is driven by a high share of contributors not reaching retirement age in lower deciles
in combination with the reduced rentability of the pension system.
5. Conclusion
This study uses German social security records to provide novel evidence about the
heterogeneity in life expectancy by lifetime earnings across cohorts 1926-1949. Our
results reveal distinct heterogeneity: For West German men of cohorts 1926-28, top and
bottom decile experience a difference in life expectancy of about 4 years (30%) at age
65. This gap widens to about 7 years (almost 50%) for cohorts 1947-49. This change
is driven by a strong increase in life expectancy for the upper deciles. By contrast, life
pension system.
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expectancy increases only slightly for low earners. In addition we document a sizable
indirect relation between lifetime earnings and life expectancy: we extend the analysis
to the household context, and show differences in life expectancies of widows depending
on their husband’s lifetime earnings. For widows, the longevity gap between top and
bottom quintile increases from about 2.5 years (more than 10%) to 4 years (about 20%)
during the observed time period.
Further, we provide evidence that the documented heterogeneity has strong distribu-
tional implications for the pension system. In line with previous studies, we show that
the German pension system is progressive when assuming homogeneous life expectancy
within a cohort. However, when accounting for the estimated heterogeneity, the pension
system turns regressive. Since high earners receive their pensions for a longer period than
low earners, the IRR of the pension system increases with lifetime earnings. Consistent
with the rising longevity gap, the regressive effects increase across cohorts. Our results
are robust to two important extensions. First, the pension system remains regressive
when we consider survivor benefits in addition to own pension benefits. This is the
case even though the distributional effect of the earlier death of low earners dominates
the regressive effects of longer living widows and higher marriage rates of high earners.
Second, using additional assumptions, we provide evidence that the regressive structure
becomes stronger when accounting for heterogeneity in mortality rates prior to age 65.
Our results have important implications for the pension system. For the evaluation
of pension reforms, it is important to have reliable estimates about heterogeneity in life
expectancy to provide a realistic view about its distributional implications. In particular,
when life expectancy is homogeneous, progressive pension formulas, minimum pension
schemes, or specific early retirement programs introduce redistribution from individuals
with high pension entitlements to individuals with low pension entitlements. Yet, when
life expectancy is heterogeneous and related to lifetime earnings, these reforms can help
reduce the regressive effects of the pension system.
Moreover our results have more general implications for the discussion on inequality.
Several studies have documented an increasing inequality of lifetime earnings during the
working life. For example, Kopczuk et al. (2010) and Guvenen et al. (2017) for the US
and, similarly, (Bo¨nke et al., 2015) for Germany find growing inequality of male lifetime
earnings between cohorts. Our findings reinforce these results: The increasing longevity
gap implies that for the considered cohorts the inequality not only increases during the
working life but as well during the retirement period. Hence policy makers are con-
fronted with an even stronger increase in inequality. The increasing lifetime inequality
can be reduced by the mentioned pension reforms which address regressive effects of
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the pension system. Another promising avenue is policy measures that affect both the
distribution of lifetime earnings and life expectancies. For example, educational reforms
may target individuals with low lifetime earnings: education can reduce inequality dur-
ing the working life. At the same time, as documented e.g. in Lleras-Muney (2005),
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Appendix I. Descriptive statistics
Table A.1: Observations of West German male retirees by cohorts
Cohort Surviving Decedent Total Cohort Surviving Decedent Total
1905 101,692 26,2514 127,943 1930 2,678,941 127,314 2,806,255
1906 132,887 31,2924 164,179 1931 2,483,456 110,264 2,593,720
1907 175,877 39,2439 215,120 1932 2,343,275 96,640 2,439,915
1908 223,875 45,9751 269,850 1933 2,242,822 87,019 2,329,841
1909 282,433 54,0376 336,470 1934 2,674,049 97,181 2,771,230
1910 338,632 60,3394 398,971 1935 2,738,728 92,465 2,831,193
1911 399,581 67,0023 466,583 1936 2,659,882 83,115 2,742,997
1912 497,588 77,1435 574,731 1937 2,555,821 74,750 2,630,571
1913 580,880 83,4644 664,344 1938 2,518,605 69,237 2,587,842
1914 635,146 86,0982 721,244 1939 2,472,220 64,435 2,536,655
1915 580,828 73,9816 654,809 1940 2,247,875 56,039 2,303,914
1916 509,461 59,8989 569,359 1941 1,873,480 44,176 1,917,656
1917 525,305 58,0219 583,326 1942 1,307,605 29,391 1,336,996
1918 599,923 62,0588 661,981 1943 1,152,980 25,032 1,178,012
1919 1,009,891 97,2582 1,107,149 1944 1,115,988 22,488 1,138,476
1920 1,428,648 128,4031 1,557,051 1945 673,340 12,939 686,279
1921 1,605,309 135,5594 1,740,868 1946 643,361 11,892 655,253
1922 1,692,026 132,4239 1,824,449 1947 523,445 8,976 532,421
1923 1,721,222 124,6211 1,845,843 1948 366,094 5,957 372,051
1924 1,839,665 123,2597 1,962,924 1949 187,811 2,872 190,683
1925 2,254,473 139,2890 2,393,762
1926 2,453,524 140,0769 2,593,600
1927 2,565,114 141,5257 2,706,639
1928 2,773,591 148,5769 2,922,167
1929 2,695,413 137,3438 2,832,756
Total 63,082,762 3,395,316 66,478,078
Source: SK90, waves 1992-2015. Notes: The data covers the universe of all pensioners. It contains
information about individual pension entitlements, pension level, survivor pensions, and date of death.
More specifically, we observe if an individual pension was discontinued the past 12 months preceding the
reporting date (November 30th). For an old-age pension, the only reason for a discontinuation is the death
of the respective individual. The sample is restricted to West German men with at least 30 accumulated
earnings points. This corresponds to about 75% of the original sample.
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Table A.2: Observations of West German widows by cohorts
Cohort Surviving Decedent Total Cohort Surviving Decedent Total
1890 11,133 2,943 14,076 1920 1,087,141 69,872 1,157,0139
1891 14,788 3,783 18,571 1921 1,083,871 66,189 1,150,0608
1892 19,224 4,484 23,708 1922 1,006,115 58,804 1,064,9198
1893 25,105 5,787 30,892 1923 910,865 50,193 961,0588
1894 33,736 7,939 41,675 1924 866,994 44,651 911,6450
1895 44,602 10,004 54,606 1925 932,812 45,360 978,1725
1896 58,973 12,793 71,766 1926 898,093 41,347 939,4401
1897 76,448 15,935 92,383 1927 884,578 38,052 922,6307
1898 100,160 20,356 120,516 1928 901,570 36,410 937,9802
1899 142,295 27,487 169,782 1929 802,147 29,463 831,6102
1900 182,961 32,770 215,731 1930 737,877 24,674 762,5517
1901 240,438 41,211 281,649 1931 623,335 19,367 642,7022
1902 301,387 48,764 350,151 1932 526,712 14,817 541,5295
1903 355,911 54,918 410,829 1933 452,272 11,867 464,1397
1904 434,529 63,688 498,217 1934 485,756 11,861 497,6177
1905 503,946 70,359 574,305 1935 436,977 9,706 446,683
1906 568,710 74,573 643,283 1936 371,218 7,796 379,014
1907 644,389 80,831 725,220 1937 309,628 6,128 315,756
1908 711,445 83,804 795,249 1938 268,814 4,995 273,809
1909 775,573 87,420 862,993 1939 234,541 4,128 238,669
1910 816,472 86,705 903,177 1940 192,304 3,326 195,630
1911 837,126 85,664 922,790 1941 139,682 2,308 141,990
1912 920,461 89,301 1,009,762 1942 87,457 1,385 88,842
1913 954,719 86,207 1,040,926 1943 69,869 979 70,848
1914 941,166 81,203 1,022,369 1944 52,301 721 53,022
1915 787,313 64,514 851,827 1945 27,189 376 27,565
1916 612,442 47,992 660,434 1946 20,807 237 21,044
1917 570,555 42,200 612,755 1947 13,661 152 13,813
1918 578,016 41,477 619,493 1948 7,158 78 7,236
1919 855,684 57,688 913,372 1949 2,627 23 2,650
Total 27,554,078 2,038,065 29,592,143
Source: SK90, waves 1992-2015. Notes: The data covers the universe of all pensioners. It contains
information about individual pension entitlements, pension level, survivor pensions, and date of death.
More specifically, we observe if an individual pension was discontinued the past 12 months preceding the
reporting date (November 30th). For a survivor pension, the only reason for a discontinuation is the death
of the respective individual. The sample is restricted to widows of West German men with at least 30
accumulated earnings points.
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Table A.3: Observations of West German men in biogra-
phy sample by decile and cohorts
Decile Cohort group Total
35-37 38-40 41-43 44-46 47-49
1 344 275 316 280 312 1527
2 253 291 324 264 261 1393
3 282 275 308 271 259 1395
4 298 273 291 299 249 1410
5 311 287 278 310 290 1476
6 300 302 289 290 280 1461
7 301 299 286 294 264 1444
8 277 315 320 252 256 1420
9 302 298 302 249 241 1392
10 305 310 292 268 242 1417
Total 2973 2925 3006 2777 2654 14335
Source: FDZ-RVVSKT2002, 2004-15 Bo¨nke. Notes: The data
is a random sub-sample of all individuals covered by the pension
insurance. It includes complete monthly employment biogra-
phies from ages 14 to 67 for cohorts 1935 through 1949. The es-
timation sample is restricted to West German men with at least
30 accumulated earnings points and further excludes those with
special pension arrangements, especially miners. The deciles
refer to the distribution of lifetime earnings. The data is acces-
sible through controlled remote computing only. A 25% sub-
sample is available as scientific use file.
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Table A.4: Months spent in labor market states of West German men from ages 14 to 65
Decile Employment Retirement Unemployment Sick leave Other Uninsured
Unrestricted sample
1 82.5 10.4 10.3 0.9 66.8 453.1
2 182.7 25.1 24.1 2.8 115.9 273.4
3 304.4 55.0 35.7 5.8 104.2 118.9
4 392.6 62.5 30.4 8.0 70.7 59.8
5 437.4 58.2 22.9 7.6 56.2 41.7
6 461.2 53.3 19.0 6.1 49.9 34.5
7 474.8 48.6 17.1 5.0 48.4 30.1
8 475.6 45.1 15.4 3.8 53.1 31.1
9 478.4 42.7 13.1 2.2 56.2 31.5
10 501.8 28.7 6.2 1.1 57.9 28.4
Estimation sample
1 362.5 51.1 35.2 6.3 86.5 82.3
2 416.0 52.5 28.3 7.0 66.4 53.8
3 445.3 52.4 22.8 6.9 54.6 41.9
4 462.5 51.2 19.3 5.6 49.8 35.6
5 473.0 48.2 18.1 5.2 47.3 32.2
6 477.5 45.0 15.6 4.5 50.5 30.9
7 477.9 44.1 14.8 3.5 52.8 31.0
8 476.6 42.5 14.3 2.4 56.6 31.7
9 482.5 39.5 10.4 1.6 58.6 31.4
10 509.4 24.6 5.0 1.0 56.5 27.5
Source: FDZ-RVVSKT2002, 2004-15 Bo¨nke. Notes: The data is a random sub-sample of all individ-
uals covered by the pension insurance. It includes complete monthly employment biographies from
ages 14 to 67 for cohorts 1935 through 1949. The estimation sample is restricted to West German
men with at least 30 accumulated earnings points and further excludes those with special pension
arrangements, especially miners. The deciles refer to the distribution of lifetime earnings. The data
is accessible through controlled remote computing only. A 25% subsample is available as scientific
use file.
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Source: SK90, waves 1992-2015. Notes: The cut-off values at age 65 are computed for
individuals born 1926-49 with at least 30 accumulated earnings points.
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Figure A.2: Observed age-specific mortality rates of West German men born between
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38-40 41-43 44-46 47-49
Source: SK90, waves 1992-2015, own calculations.
Figure A.3: Observed age-specific log-odds of mortality of West German men born be-
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Source: SK90, waves 1992-2015, own calculations.
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Appendix II. Parameter estimates






Cohorts 1908− 10 0.006 0.0133
Cohorts 1911− 13 -0.001 0.0127
Cohorts 1914− 16 -0.011 0.0130
Cohorts 1917− 19 -0.047 0.0132
Cohorts 1920− 22 -0.092 0.0124
Cohorts 1923− 25 -0.150 0.0125
Cohorts 1926− 28 -0.182 0.0125
Cohorts 1929− 31 -0.180 0.0128
Cohorts 1932− 34 -0.195 0.0131
Cohorts 1935− 37 -0.252 0.0133
Cohorts 1938− 40 -0.287 0.0137
Cohorts 1941− 43 -0.292 0.0148
Cohorts 1944− 46 -0.312 0.0171
Cohorts 1947− 49 -0.353 0.0226
2nd decile 16.583 21.5386
3rd decile 17.058 21.9528
4th decile -27.067 22.2532
5th decile -40.145 22.5638
6th decile -3.791 22.4194
7th decile -1.024 22.5306
8th decile -41.769 22.7171
9th decile 2.035 22.9163
10th decile -38.432 22.1587
Age × 2nd decile -0.844 1.0907
Age × 3rd decile -0.939 1.1114
Age × 4th decile 1.234 1.1261
Age × 5th decile 1.906 1.1411
Age × 6th decile 0.027 1.1329
Age × 7th decile -0.094 1.1377
Age × 8th decile 1.952 1.1459
Age × 9th decile -0.297 1.1547
Age × 10th decile 1.713 1.1130
Age2/100 × 2nd decile 1.577 2.0619
Age2/100 × 3rd decile 1.860 2.1006
Age2/100 × 4th decile -2.152 2.1273
Age2/100 × 5th decile -3.465 2.1545
Age2/100 × 6th decile 0.145 2.1373
Age2/100 × 7th decile 0.323 2.1449
Age2/100 × 8th decile -3.527 2.1579
Age2/100 × 9th decile 0.756 2.1721
Age2/100 × 10th decile -3.005 2.0872
Notes: Mortality probabilities are estimated as a function of an age polynomial interacted with the
earnings deciles, cohort-specific effects, fixed effects of the earnings deciles, and the interaction of the
cohort and earnings fixed effects. The 1st decile is the baseline of the earnings decile fixed effects
and due to the additional interaction terms the effects refer to cohorts 1905-07. As reflected by
the confidence bands of the predicted life expectancies, all joint decile effects are highly significant.
Further, the joint age effects by decile also differ significantly. The cohorts 1905-1907 are the baseline
of the cohort fixed effects, where the cohort fixed effects refer to the 1st decile. Hence, the baseline
of the interaction effects is the 1st decile and the cohorts 1905-07. Since the interactions between
cohort and earnings fixed effects for cohorts before 1926 are irrelevant for our analysis, they are not
shown in the tables; they can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Table A.6: Parameter estimates: logistic regression of West German men’s mortality II
Estimate Standard error
Age3/1002 × 2nd decile -1.286 1.7246
Age3/1002 × 3rd decile -1.589 1.7567
Age3/1002 × 4th decile 1.700 1.7782
Age3/1002 × 5th decile 2.843 1.7999
Age3/1002 × 6th decile -0.216 1.7841
Age3/1002 × 7th decile -0.320 1.7892
Age3/1002 × 8th decile 2.887 1.7980
Age3/1002 × 9th decile -0.716 1.8078
Age3/1002 × 10th decile 2.401 1.7319
Age4/1003 × 2nd decile 0.388 0.5385
Age4/1003 × 3rd decile 0.498 0.5484
Age4/1003 × 4th decile -0.511 0.5549
Age4/1003 × 5th decile -0.885 0.5614
Age4/1003 × 6th decile 0.082 0.5560
Age4/1003 × 7th decile 0.101 0.5572
Age4/1003 × 8th decile -0.896 0.5593
Age4/1003 × 9th decile 0.236 0.5618
Age4/1003 × 10th decile -0.726 0.5365
Cohorts 1926− 28 × 2nd decile 0.038 0.0185
Cohorts 1926− 28 × 3rd decile 0.026 0.0190
Cohorts 1926− 28 × 4th decile 0.015 0.0193
Cohorts 1926− 28 × 5th decile -0.008 0.0192
Cohorts 1926− 28 × 6th decile -0.019 0.0190
Cohorts 1926− 28 × 7th decile -0.038 0.0188
Cohorts 1926− 28 × 8th decile -0.015 0.0184
Cohorts 1926− 28 × 9th decile 0.013 0.0184
Cohorts 1926− 28 × 10th decile 0.077 0.0166
Cohorts 1929− 31 × 2nd decile 0.032 0.0189
Cohorts 1929− 31 × 3rd decile 0.001 0.0193
Cohorts 1929− 31 × 4th decile -0.040 0.0197
Cohorts 1929− 31 × 5th decile -0.069 0.0196
Cohorts 1929− 31 × 6th decile -0.086 0.0194
Cohorts 1929− 31 × 7th decile -0.104 0.0192
Cohorts 1929− 31 × 8th decile -0.071 0.0188
Cohorts 1929− 31 × 9th decile -0.044 0.0188
Cohorts 1929− 31 × 10th decile 0.024 0.0171
Cohorts 1932− 34 × 2nd decile -0.006 0.0193
Cohorts 1932− 34 × 3rd decile -0.084 0.0198
Cohorts 1932− 34 × 4th decile -0.151 0.0202
Cohorts 1932− 34 × 5th decile -0.187 0.0201
Cohorts 1932− 34 × 6th decile -0.193 0.0200
Cohorts 1932− 34 × 7th decile -0.214 0.0198
Cohorts 1932− 34 × 8th decile -0.196 0.0195
Cohorts 1932− 34 × 9th decile -0.176 0.0196
Cohorts 1932− 34 × 10th decile -0.097 0.0180
Notes: Mortality probabilities are estimated as a function of an age polynomial interacted with the
earnings deciles, cohort-specific effects, fixed effects of the earnings deciles, and the interaction of the
cohort and earnings fixed effects. The 1st decile is the baseline of the earnings decile fixed effects
and due to the additional interaction terms the effects refer to cohorts 1905-07. As reflected by
the confidence bands of the predicted life expectancies, all joint decile effects are highly significant.
Further, the joint age effects by decile also differ significantly. The cohorts 1905-1907 are the baseline
of the cohort fixed effects, where the cohort fixed effects refer to the 1st decile. Hence, the baseline
of the interaction effects is the 1st decile and the cohorts 1905-07. Since the interactions between
cohort and earnings fixed effects for cohorts before 1926 are irrelevant for our analysis, they are not
shown in the tables; they can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Table A.7: Parameter estimates: logistic regression of West German men’s mortality III
Estimate Standard error
Cohorts 1935− 37 × 2nd decile -0.034 0.0196
Cohorts 1935− 37 × 3rd decile -0.113 0.0200
Cohorts 1935− 37 × 4th decile -0.187 0.0204
Cohorts 1935− 37 × 5th decile -0.234 0.0204
Cohorts 1935− 37 × 6th decile -0.242 0.0203
Cohorts 1935− 37 × 7th decile -0.270 0.0202
Cohorts 1935− 37 × 8th decile -0.267 0.0199
Cohorts 1935− 37 × 9th decile -0.253 0.0200
Cohorts 1935− 37 × 10th decile -0.139 0.0186
Cohorts 1938− 40 × 2nd decile -0.060 0.0201
Cohorts 1938− 40 × 3rd decile -0.131 0.0206
Cohorts 1938− 40 × 4th decile -0.217 0.0210
Cohorts 1938− 40 × 5th decile -0.268 0.0211
Cohorts 1938− 40 × 6th decile -0.302 0.0210
Cohorts 1938− 40 × 7th decile -0.330 0.0209
Cohorts 1938− 40 × 8th decile -0.339 0.0207
Cohorts 1938− 40 × 9th decile -0.303 0.0209
Cohorts 1938− 40 × 10th decile -0.249 0.0198
Cohorts 1941− 43 × 2nd decile -0.078 0.0218
Cohorts 1941− 43 × 3rd decile -0.153 0.0223
Cohorts 1941− 43 × 4th decile -0.247 0.0229
Cohorts 1941− 43 × 5th decile -0.326 0.0231
Cohorts 1941− 43 × 6th decile -0.341 0.0231
Cohorts 1941− 43 × 7th decile -0.403 0.0232
Cohorts 1941− 43 × 8th decile -0.397 0.0231
Cohorts 1941− 43 × 9th decile -0.385 0.0236
Cohorts 1941− 43 × 10th decile -0.304 0.0229
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 2nd decile -0.054 0.0250
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 3rd decile -0.163 0.0258
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 4th decile -0.265 0.0266
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 5th decile -0.288 0.0269
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 6th decile -0.366 0.0273
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 7th decile -0.383 0.0276
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 8th decile -0.452 0.0282
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 9th decile -0.412 0.0290
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 10th decile -0.321 0.0294
Cohorts 1944− 46 × 2nd decile -0.076 0.0330
Cohorts 1947− 49 × 3rd decile -0.211 0.0345
Cohorts 1947− 49 × 4th decile -0.249 0.0355
Cohorts 1947− 49 × 5th decile -0.378 0.0370
Cohorts 1947− 49 × 6th decile -0.384 0.0376
Cohorts 1947− 49 × 7th decile -0.407 0.0383
Cohorts 1947− 49 × 8th decile -0.382 0.0391
Cohorts 1947− 49 × 9th decile -0.382 0.0411
Cohorts 1947− 49 × 10th decile -0.324 0.0440
Constant -120.309 14.7102
Notes: Mortality probabilities are estimated as a function of an age polynomial interacted with the
earnings deciles, cohort-specific effects, fixed effects of the earnings deciles, and the interaction of the
cohort and earnings fixed effects. The 1st decile is the baseline of the earnings decile fixed effects
and due to the additional interaction terms the effects refer to cohorts 1905-07. As reflected by
the confidence bands of the predicted life expectancies, all joint decile effects are highly significant.
Further, the joint age effects by decile also differ significantly. The cohorts 1905-1907 are the baseline
of the cohort fixed effects, where the cohort fixed effects refer to the 1st decile. Hence, the baseline
of the interaction effects is the 1st decile and the cohorts 1905-07. Since the interactions between
cohort and earnings fixed effects for cohorts before 1926 are irrelevant for our analysis, they are not
shown in the tables; they can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Appendix III. Measures for distributional analysis
Pension wealth
All pensions are compounded/discounted to the year 2015 with the consumer price index.
For the evolution of pensions after 2017 we assume a small real pension growth following
Lu¨then (2016) (approximately 1.5% per year).
We consider pension wealth at age 65. The pension wealth in the baseline scenario
consists of the sum of pensions received from retirement age R until age 65 and the
pensions received after age 65. While pension received prior to age 65 are received with








where pj,a depicts the pensions received of individual j at age a, R indicates the age
of retirement, and φ65cg,a,d is the survival probability of cohort group cg and decile d until
age a conditional on reaching age 65.
In addition to the baseline scenario, we consider two extensions. The first extension













• λcg,q is percentage of deceased husbands pension by cohort group cg and earnings
quintile q;
• σcg,q,a is probability to leave a widow by cohort group cg, earnings quintile q and
age a; and
• ψcg,q,a is remaining life expectancy of a widow of cohort group cg, earnings quintile
q and age a.
In short, the term representing survivor benefits increases pension wealth. The term
consists of the survivor pension level (§46, SGB IV) multiplied with the probability
that the pension is received. This probability consists of two components: (1) the
probability that the husband died in the previous year, the difference in conditional
survival probabilities between the current and last year, φ65cg,a−1,d − φ65cg,a,d. Component
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(1) is multiplied by (2), the probability σcg,q,a to leave a widow after death. For the
expected pensions amount, the individual pension p is multiplied with the remaining life
expectancy of the widow, ψcg,q,a, and the percentage of the husband’s pension the widow
is entitled to.28 For further details on the calculation of probabilities see Section 4.3.
For the second extension, we estimate mortality rates before 65 as depicted in Sec-





where φ14cg,a,d is the survival probability of cohort group cg and decile d until age a
conditional on reaching age 65.
Internal rate of return
To express the IRR in year 2015 real values, before calculating the IRR, all values have
been compounded/discounted to the year 2015 with the consumer price index. For the
evolution of pensions after 2017 we assume a small real pension growth (see the previous
subsection on pension wealth). The IRR is the interest rate i that equalizes the stream
of contributions c one the left-hand side and the expected stream of pensions p at the















• cj,a is contributions of individual j at age a;
• pj,a is pensions received of individual j at age a;
• φ65cg,a,d is the survival probability of cohort group cg and decile d until age a con-
ditional on reaching age 65;
• ij is individual rate of return (IRR); and
• R is age of retirement.
28In general, widow(ers) are entitled to up to 60% of the deceased partners pension. However if a
widow earns income above a certain threshold, the entitlement percentage is reduced. This decrease
amounts to 40% for each EURO that the widow’s income exceeds the threshold. We observe the
percentage of the husband’s former pension that is actually received by the widow. The cohort- and
quintile-specific percentage of the husband’s former pension, λcg,q, fluctuates around 53-55%.
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The left-hand side contains the contributions from age 14 until retirement age R.
The right-hand side depicts the pensions from R to age 100 and is split into two parts.
The first term represents the pensions from R to age 65. The second term includes
the pensions ranging from age 66 to age 100. Here, φv,a,d denotes the decile-, cohort
group- and age-specific mortality rates estimated in Section 3. Each term in the equation
includes the discount factor ij (the IRR), which balances both sides and is computed
from the data on an individual basis.
We consider two extensions to this baseline scenario. The first extension includes

















• λcg,q is percentage of deceased husbands pension by cohort group cg and earnings
quintile q;
• σcg,q,a is probability to leave a widow by cohort group cg, earnings quintile q and
age a; and
• ψcg,q,a is remaining life expectancy of a widow of cohort group cg, earnings quintile
q and age a.
The survivor pension is found exclusively in the second term on the right-hand side.
Here, the probability of dying in the previous year, φ65cg,a−1,d − φ65cg,a,d, is multiplied with
the expected remaining life expectancy of the widow ψcg,q,a and the percentage of the
partners’ pension that is received by the widow λcg,q. Usually, survivor pensions amount
to 60% of the deceased partners pension. However, the 60% of the husbands’ pension is
reduced if the survivors’ own income exceed a certain threshold. This decrease amounts
to 40% per EURO that the income exceeds the threshold. From the widow pensions, we
can further determine the percentage of the husbands’ former pension that is actually
received by the widow. This percentage is rather stable and λcg,q fluctuates around 53-
55% across cohort groups and quintiles of lifetime earnings. For further details on the
calculation see Section 4.3 and the previous subsection on pension wealth.
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The second extension includes mortality before age 65. For their calculation see Sec-









Now, both the contributions on the left-hand side and the pensions on the right-hand
side include the survival probability φ65cg,a,d. Since φ
65
cg,a,d now extends for the entire age
range, the right-hand side contains only one term.
Appendix, p. 13
Appendix IV. Surviving widows
While the SK90 data includes exact pension levels, the probability of survivor pension
receipt is more complicated to estimate. For this purpose, we combine information about
male mortality rates, probabilities of leaving a widow (that are estimated as described in
the following paragraph), and widow mortality rates (computed as described in section
3.4). First, the probabilities of leaving a widow in the case of death in a given year are
combined with the probabilities of a surviving widow from all previous years after age
65. Second, we combine these probabilities with the male mortality rates in order to
obtain the probabilities of surviving widows, i.e. the probabilities of receiving survivor
benefits. Our estimations show that recipience has an inverted u-shape over age that
differs by quintile. For the lower quintiles, recipience peaks at younger ages than for the
upper quintiles. For a depiction, see Figure A.4.
We model the individual i’s log odds of leaving a widow at a certain age of death
as log
Pr(leaveitcq |death at age t)






p + µq + ηc + νcq, where
q is the quintile of the deceased husbands’ lifetime earnings, c his cohort group, and
age t the age that the deceased husband would have reached at the respective reporting
date. Cut-offs defining the quintiles are equal to those for men at age 65. The model
is estimated on a sample combining male death’ and widows first receiving survivor
benefits in their husbands’ year of death. The probability of leaving a widow is zero at
age 65 by construction. Estimates can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Figure A.4: Probability of surviving widow for West German men conditional on reaching
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Notes: Panel (a) displays probabilities for cohorts 1935-37. Panel (b) displays proba-
bilities for cohorts 1947-49. Respective probabilities for the other cohort groups can be
obtained upon request.
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Appendix V. Mortality before age 65
Figure A.5: Predicted mortality and survival rates for West German men by earnings
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Notes: Panel (a) displays rates for cohorts 1935-37. Panel (b) displays rates for cohorts
1947-49. Respective rates for the other cohort groups can be obtained upon request.
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Appendix VI. Robustness checks
Figure A.6: Comparison of mean predicted mortality rates based on logistic regression
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Notes: The graph displays the mean predicted mortality rates in the estimation sample
of West German men for cohorts 1905 to 1949. The logistic regression model is specified
as described in Section 3.2. The nonparametric estimation relies on a Nadaraya-Watson
kernel regression (Nadaraya, 1964, Watson, 1964) with an epanechnikov kernel and the
rule-of-thumb bandwidth of Fan and Gijbels (1996). We do not show confidence bands
because these bands are extremely narrow for the mean predictions.
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Notes: Panel (a): estimation based on sample of individuals with more than 25 (instead
of 30) earnings points. Panel (b): estimation based on unrestricted sample where lower
deciles contain a mix of lifetime poor individuals, civil servants, and the self-employed.
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